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THE DIFFICULTY OF TEMPORAL 
JURISDICTION IN JANOWIEC  
AND OTHERS v. RUSSIA 
JULIA KOCH* 
Abstract: In October 2013, the European Court of Human Rights ruled on 
claims brought against the Russian Federation for the 1940 massacre of more 
than 21,000 prisoners of war. Relatives of the prisoners challenged that Russia 
had, among other things, failed in its legal obligation to carry out an adequate 
and effective investigation into the massacre. The court concluded that it did not 
have temporal jurisdiction to evaluate the merits of these claims; it stated that 
Russia’s legal obligation to investigate could not extend to transgressions that oc-
curred prior to the existence of the convention under which the claims had been 
brought. Unfortunately, in looking to the convention and not to international cus-
tomary law as the source of temporal jurisdiction, the court was unable to protect 
the rights of the prisoners and their relatives. The court should have looked to 
customary law to establish temporal jurisdiction so that it could reach the merits 
of the case and hold Russia accountable for its gross violation of human rights. 
INTRODUCTION 
After more than seventy years, the families of prisoners of war who were 
massacred during World War II continue to search for justice and relief in Jan-
owiec and Others v. Russia.1 On October 13, 2013, the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) ruled on applications brought by fifteen Polish nation-
als (applicants) against the Russian Federation under the Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Convention).2 The 
applicants were relatives of Polish prisoners who were killed by the Soviet 
Army in 1940.3 In total, 21,857 Polish, Ukrainian, and Belarusian prisoners 
perished in what became known as the Katyn Massacre.4 The Grand Chamber 
of the ECtHR found Russia to be in violation of Article 38 of the Convention 
for its refusal to furnish documents to the court.5 The ECtHR, however, reject-
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 1 See Janowiec v. Russia, App. Nos. 55508/07 and 29520/09, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 1, 19 (2013), availa-
ble at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-127684, archived at http://perma.
cc/CC2P-V4FK. 
 2 See id. 
 3 Id. ¶¶ 25–37. 
 4 Id. ¶¶ 18, 23. 
 5 Id. ¶ 216. 
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ed the applicants’ claims as to violations of Article 2, which alleged Russia’s 
failure to conduct an adequate investigation of the massacre, and Article 3, 
which alleged that Russia’s prolonged denial of the facts and withholding of 
evidence amounted to inhuman or degrading treatment.6 This case highlights 
the difficulty of holding states accountable for past atrocities, particularly be-
cause the ECtHR rejected the applicants’ Article 2 claims on the grounds that it 
had no temporal jurisdiction over Russia.7 
Part I of this Comment provides the facts of the case, including the cir-
cumstances and subsequent investigation of the Katyn Massacre. Part II pre-
sents a discussion of the parties’ arguments and the ECtHR’s holding regarding 
the applicants’ Article 2 claims. Part III challenges the ECtHR’s evaluation of 
temporal jurisdiction with respect to the Article 2 claims and posits that the 
court should have recognized that international customary law obligated Rus-
sia to conduct an effective investigation into the Katyn Massacre. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. The Katyn Massacre 
In late 1939, the Soviet Army invaded and annexed portions of eastern 
Poland, detaining approximately 250,000 Polish soldiers, border guards, police 
officers, and state officials.8 Although some were released, the remaining de-
tainees were sent to regional Soviet prison camps established by the People’s 
Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD).9 On March 5, 1940, Lavrentiy Be-
ria, head of the NKVD, submitted a proposal to Joseph Stalin, Secretary Gen-
eral of the Soviet Communist Party, to execute the detainees.10 The proposal 
labeled the prisoners as “enemies of the Soviet authorities and filled with ha-
tred towards the Soviet system,” and it identified approximately 14,700 Polish 
prisoners and 11,000 Ukrainian and Belarusian prisoners to be shot.11 On the 
same date, the country’s highest governing body, the Politburo of the Central 
Committee of the Soviet Communist Party, approved the proposal, determining 
that executions would occur without summoning the detainees and without 
                                                                                                                           
 6 Id. ¶¶ 102, 161–162, 189. 
 7 See id. ¶¶ 159–161. 
 8 Id. ¶¶ 15–16. 
 9 Id. ¶ 16. In Russian, NKVD stands for Narodny Komissariat Vnutrennikh Del, which functioned 
as the Soviet secret police and was superseded by the KGB, or the Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Be-
zopasnosti, in 1954. See id.; Robert W. Pringle, KGB, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA [ONLINE], (Feb. 
18, 2013), http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/315989/KGB, archived at http://perma.cc/
39KQ-C9NF; NKVD, in ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, available at http:// www.britannica.com/EB
checked/topic/416682/NKVD, archived at http://perma.cc/5NDH-TNZP. 
 10 Janowiec v. Russia, App. Nos. 55508/07 and 29520/09, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 17 (2013). 
 11 Id. 
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bringing any charges.12 Between April and May of that year, 21,857 prisoners 
were summarily shot and buried in mass graves in the Katyn Forest in Russia 
and elsewhere throughout Eastern Europe.13 
Key documentation of the massacre includes Beria’s March 5, 1940 pro-
posal; the Politburo’s March 5, 1940 approval; certain pages removed from the 
minutes of the Politburo’s meeting; and a 1959 note to Nikita Kruschev, Secre-
tary General of the Soviet Communist Party, confirming the execution of 
21,857 prisoners and suggesting that all records regarding the prisoners be de-
stroyed.14 Specifically, the 1959 note recommended: 
[A]n unforeseen incident could lead to the [true nature of the Katyn 
Massacre] being revealed, with all the undesirable consequences 
that would entail for our country, especially since, as regards the 
persons shot in the Katyn Forest, the official version was confirmed 
by an investigation carried out on the initiative of the Soviet authori-
ties . . . On the basis of the above, it seems opportune to destroy all 
the records concerning the persons shot in 1940 in the above-
mentioned operation . . . .15 
These key documents were put into a file known as Package Number 1, which 
remained sealed until 2010 when the Russian State Archives Services pub-
lished them online.16 
B. Investigation and Inquiry 
For much of the century, the Soviet government denied or deflected 
wrongdoing with respect to the Katyn Massacre, and in 1946 it accused and 
attempted to indict German war criminals for the killings before the Interna-
tional Military Tribunal.17 
It was not until 1990 that Soviet President Mikail Gorbachev produced to 
the Polish government certain documents pertaining to the massacre.18 Also in 
1990, a regional Ukrainian prosecutor’s office opened what would become 
known as Investigation Number 159—a criminal investigation into the prison-
ers’ disappearances that the Soviet government would later take over.19 In 
1991, as part of Investigation Number 159, Polish and Russian specialists in-
terviewed approximately forty witnesses and exhumed corpses that had been 
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46 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 38:E. Supp. 
discovered in mass burial sites in and around the Katyn Forest.20 In 1992, Rus-
sian President Boris Yeltsin formally acknowledged that Stalin and the Politbu-
ro had sentenced the prisoners to death and turned over additional documents 
to the Polish authorities, including the Politburo’s March 5, 1940 approval of 
the executions.21 Additionally, in 2002, Ukrainian authorities discovered and 
produced documents showing the transfer of Polish prisoners to a NKVD camp 
in the Katyn Forest region.22 
In 2004, however, the Russian government discontinued Investigation 
Number 159 because the people allegedly responsible for the massacre were 
deceased.23 As a result, Russian authorities classified forty-four of the 183 vol-
umes of the case as well as the reason for discontinuing the investigation as 
“top-secret” or for “internal use only.”24 Russian authorities refused, at multi-
ple junctures in this case, to produce the 2004 decision to the ECtHR, despite 
the court’s request.25 
In October 2008, the Military Court of the Moscow Command dismissed 
an appeal by several of the applicants challenging both the efficacy and the 
discontinuation of Investigation Number 159.26 The Supreme Court of the 
Russian Federation affirmed the dismissal in its entirety, agreeing with the Mil-
itary Court that, while the names of the applicants’ relatives appeared on 
NKVD prisoner lists, the actual fate of these prisoners could not be determined 
since their bodies had not been recovered.27 The applicants countered that the 
investigation’s ineffectiveness was a direct result of the authorities’ failure to 
take biological samples from the applicants in an attempt to identify the ex-
humed corpses as those of the applicants’ relatives.28 
Memorial, a Russian human rights organization, also attempted to gain 
access to information surrounding Investigation Number 159.29 In 2008, it 
sought to declassify the 2004 decision to discontinue Investigation Number 
159 via an application to the Inter-Agency Commission for the Protection of 
State Secrets (Commission).30 The Moscow City Court held that, under the 
States Secrets Act, there were no legal grounds for granting Memorial’s re-
quest since the 2004 decision contained intelligence and information that con-
                                                                                                                           
 20 Id. ¶ 40. 
 21 Id. ¶ 41. 
 22 Id. ¶ 43. 
 23 Id. ¶ 45. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. ¶¶ 46, 207, 216. 
 26 Id. ¶¶ 57–58. 
 27 Id. ¶¶ 58, 60. 
 28 Id. ¶ 59. 
 29 Id. ¶¶ 61–62. 
 30 Id. 
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stituted a state secret.31 The Supreme Court of the Russian Federation affirmed 
both the Commission’s and the City Court’s refusal to declassify the 2004 de-
cision.32 
As a result of these frustrations and repeated dismissals in Russian courts, 
the applicants, in 2007 and 2009, filed two applications with the ECtHR 
against the Russian Federation alleging violations of Articles 2, 3, and 38 of 
the Convention.33 Article 2 guarantees “[e]veryone’s right to life” and has also 
been interpreted to require an “adequate and effective investigation” into the 
alleged violation of the right to life, which the applicants claimed that Russia 
failed to do.34 Article 3 protects from “torture or . . . inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment,” which the applicants alleged resulted from Russia’s 
prolonged denial of the facts and withholding of pertinent information about 
the applicants’ relatives.35 Finally, Article 38 requires the production of “all 
necessary facilities” and documents to the ECtHR so that the court can under-
take a proper investigation, which the applicants alleged that Russia failed to 
do with respect to the 2004 decision to discontinue Investigation Number 
159.36 In 2012, a Chamber of the ECtHR’s Fifth Section found that Russia had 
violated Article 3 as to certain applicants and Article 38 as to all applicants.37 
Additionally, the court stated that it could not reach the merits of the Article 2 
claims.38 The applicants appealed the entire decision to the Grand Chamber of 
the ECtHR.39 
II. DISCUSSION 
In October 2013, the Grand Chamber overruled the lower court’s holding 
regarding Russia’s violation of Article 3, but affirmed its holding regarding the 
violation of Article 38.40 The Grand Chamber also affirmed the holding regard-
ing Article 2 and concluded that it lacked the temporal jurisdiction necessary to 
adjudicate the applicants’ Article 2 claims.41 
                                                                                                                           
 31 Id. ¶ 64. 
 32 Id. ¶ 65. 
 33 See id. ¶¶ 1, 7, 56, 60. 
 34 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 2, Nov. 4, 
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (as amended by Protocol No. 11, which entered into force May 11, 1994) 
[hereinafter Convention]; Janowiec, App. Nos. 55508/07 and 29520/09, ¶ 102; McCann v. United 
Kingdom, App. No. 18984/91, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 161 (1995), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/
eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-57943, archived at http://perma.cc/RT9J-YHU6. 
 35 Convention, supra note 34, art. 3; Janowiec, App. Nos. 55508/07 and 29520/09, ¶ 162. 
 36 Convention, supra note 34, art. 38; Janowiec, App. Nos. 55508/07 and 29520/09, ¶ 190. 
 37 Janowiec, App. Nos. 55508/07 and 29520/09, ¶ 7. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. ¶¶ 7, 8. 
 40 Janowiec v. Russia, App. Nos. 55508/07 and 29520/09, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 8, 189, 216 (2013). 
 41 Id. ¶¶ 8, 161. 
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A. Temporal Jurisdiction Over the Article 2 Claims 
Article 2 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fun-
damental Freedoms states that “[e]veryone’s right to life shall be protected by 
law,” which is considered the Article’s substantive obligation.42 Pursuant to 
ECtHR case law and Article 28 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Trea-
ties, however, the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms cannot retroactively bind a party on the basis of events that 
wholly took place prior to its date of entry into force.43 Although the human 
rights Convention was concluded on November 4, 1950, Russia did not be-
come a party to the treaty until May 5, 1998, which is the date of entry into 
force or the “critical date.”44 Russia’s rights and obligations arising out of the 
human rights convention are strictly limited to those occurring on or after May 
5, 1998.45 
The applicants, however, did not challenge the Russian government’s 
failure to protect their relatives’ right to life under Article 2, but rather the gov-
ernment’s failure to put forth an “adequate and effective investigation” of the 
massacre.46 This obligation to conduct a meaningful investigation into the 
Katyn Massacre is considered the “procedural limb” of Article 2.47 While not 
expressly contained in the text of the Article, the ECtHR first recognized this 
procedural obligation in its 1995 decision in McCann v. United Kingdom.48 
The court continued to develop this case law, and several years later, in Šilih v. 
Slovenia, it determined that the procedural limb is detachable and autonomous 
from the Article’s substantive obligations.49 Thus, in certain circumstances, the 
court may have temporal jurisdiction over a party’s procedural obligation to 
investigate, but not over a party’s substantive obligation.50 This separation may 
grant the ECtHR jurisdiction over a party’s procedural obligation, even though 
                                                                                                                           
 42 Convention, supra note 34; see Janowiec, App. Nos. 55508/07 and 29520/09, ¶¶ 131–132. 
 43 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 28, May 23, 1969, 18232 U.N.T.S. 332; Jan-
owiec, App. Nos. 55508/07 and 29520/09 , ¶ 128; see Varnava v. Turkey, 2009-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 13, 
58–59 (2009); Šilih v. Slovenia, App. No. 71463/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 140 (2009), available at http://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-92142, archived at http://perma.cc/R9VZ-5W59; 
Blečić v. Croatia, 2006-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 51, 73 (2006). 
 44 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms Treaty Status, 
COUNCIL OF EUROPE (July 10, 2014), http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp
?NT=005&CM=&DF=&CL=ENG (last visited Oct. 6, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/EF3E-XVB9; 
see Janowiec, App. Nos. 55508/07 and 29520/09, ¶ 128. 
 45 See Janowiec, App. Nos. 55508/07 and 29520/09, ¶¶ 128, 130, 157. 
 46 Id. ¶ 102. 
 47 Id. 
 48 McCann v. United Kingdom, App. No. 18984/91, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 161 (1995). 
 49 Šilih v. Slovenia, App. No. 71463/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 159 (2009). 
 50 See Janowiec, App. Nos. 55508/07 and 29520/09, ¶ 131; Šilih, App. No. 71463/01, ¶ 159. 
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the substantive facts that trigger the offending state’s obligation occurred be-
fore the critical date.51 
1. The Genuine Connection Test 
The ECtHR recognized that the Šilih decision created two limitations on 
jurisdiction in instances where the substantive violation occurred before the 
critical date.52 First, the court must successfully apply the Genuine Connection 
Test in order to demonstrate its jurisdiction.53 Only if there is a genuine con-
nection between the triggering event and the Convention’s entry into force will 
the court have jurisdiction to evaluate whether the investigation was adequate 
and effective.54 
In this determination, the most important element to consider is whether 
the lapse of time between the triggering event and the critical date is “reasona-
bly short.”55 In addition, a major portion of the investigation must be carried 
out, or should have been carried out, after the critical date.56 In its interpreta-
tion of Šilih, the Janowiec court noted that if a major portion of the investiga-
tion occurs before the critical date, the court may not have temporal jurisdic-
tion over the claim.57 Failure to establish both a reasonably short time lapse 
and a major portion of post-critical date investigation will lead to a determina-
tion that there is no genuine connection and thus, that there can be no temporal 
jurisdiction over procedural claims that arose from events preceding the criti-
cal date.58 
2. The Convention Values Test 
If there is no genuine connection, the court may alternatively apply the 
Convention Values Test and exercise jurisdiciton if the court determines that 
jurisdiction is “needed to ensure that the guarantees and the underlying values 
of the Convention are protected in a real and effective way.”59 This test is re-
served for extraordinary situations in which the triggering event was larger, 
more offensive, and in stark opposition to the foundations of the Convention—
essentially war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide.60 Pursuant to 
the ECtHR case law however, the Convention Values Test cannot apply to 
                                                                                                                           
 51 Janowiec, App. Nos. 55508/07 and 29520/09, ¶¶ 131, 138. 
 52 Id. ¶ 141; see Šilih, App. No. 71463/01, ¶ 163. 
 53 See Janowiec, App. Nos. 55508/07 and 29520/09, ¶ 141. 
 54 See id. ¶¶ 141, 145, 147. 
 55 Id. ¶ 146. 
 56 Id. ¶¶ 147–148. 
 57 Id. ¶ 147. 
 58 See id. ¶ 148. 
 59 Id. ¶¶ 141, 149. 
 60 Id. ¶¶ 150–151. 
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events that occurred prior to the adoption date of the Convention and its val-
ues, which was November 4, 1950.61 
B. The Parties’ Arguments and the Court’s Holding 
With this in mind, the applicants argued that, with respect to the Genuine 
Connection Test, the meaning of “major part of the investigation” should be 
construed broadly to include not only the most important steps of the investi-
gation but also “new and sufficiently important procedural facts.”62 According-
ly, this would include the 2004 decision to discontinue Investigation Number 
159, which would constitute a new procedural development in terminating the 
investigation.63 Additionally, the applicants argued that, under the Convention 
Values Test, Russia’s procedural obligations were well within the jurisdiction 
of the court.64 They argued that the very nature, magnitude, and gravity of cer-
tain acts should grant the court temporal jurisdiction, and to hold otherwise 
would undermine the very purpose of the Convention, which is to “secur[e] the 
universal and effective recognition” of human rights.65 
Finally, the applicants charged that, independent of the Convention, the 
Katyn Massacre was a violation of international law under The Hague Conven-
tion IV of 1907, which put into writing the accepted laws and customs of war, 
and the Geneva Convention of 1929, which instituted international law specifi-
cally on the treatment of prisoners of war.66 Although the Soviet Union was not 
a party to either convention in 1940, the applicants asserted that the protection 
of prisoners from acts of violence and cruelty was international customary law 
and was merely codified in the conventions.67 Thus, regardless of the Soviet 
Union’s participation in the conventions, it was bound by custom not to com-
mit war crimes against the prisoners.68 
The Russian government, on the other hand, focused on the basic chro-
nology of events and emphasized the legal distinction between a situation 
where a violation of the Convention occurred outside of the court’s temporal 
jurisdiction and a situation where a violation did not legally exist at all.69 Rus-
sia argued that the court did not have the ability to evaluate its compliance with 
the procedural limb of Article 2 for two reasons—first, the Convention and its 
                                                                                                                           
 61 Id. ¶ 151. 
 62 Id. ¶¶ 118, 148. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. ¶ 115. 
 65 Convention, supra note 34, at pmbl.; Janowiec, App. Nos. 55508/07 and 29520/09, ¶ 115. 
 66 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, arts. 2, 46, 61, 63, July 27, 
1929, 118 U.N.T.S. 343; The Hague Convention IV Annex to the Convention, arts. 4, 23(c), 50, Oct. 
18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277; Janowiec, App. Nos. 55508/07 and 29520/09, ¶ 116. 
 67 Janowiec, App. Nos. 55508/07 and 29520/09, ¶ 116. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. ¶ 108. 
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procedural obligation did not even exist at the time of the Katyn Massacre; and 
second, Russia did not agree to be bound by the Convention until fifty-eight 
years after the massacre.70 Russia also contended that, at the time of the Katyn 
Massacre, there was “no universally binding provision of international law on 
the definition of war crimes or crimes against humanity.”71 It argued that inter-
national law, as of 1940, did not provide a suitable definition or basis for char-
acterizing the Katyn Massacre as a war crime or crime against humanity.72 
Moreover, any of these crimes, insufficiently defined as they were, could only 
be attributed to major war criminals of the European Axis powers, pursuant to 
the findings of the International Military Tribunal.73 
Ultimately, the ECtHR found the fifty-eight-year period between the trig-
ger event in 1940 and the critical date in 1998 to be too long in “absolute 
terms” to establish a genuine connection.74 It also refused to characterize any 
of the Investigation Number 159 procedures that occurred after 1998 as “real 
investigative steps.”75 Although a significant number of investigative steps 
were recently taken, including the excavation of mass burial sites, forensic 
studies, interviews, and coordinated meetings between various multinational 
authorities, they occurred primarily in 1991 and 1992, several years before the 
critical date of May 5, 1998.76 Thus, as the court found that neither require-
ment set out in Šilih was met—the reasonably short time lapse and a majority 
of investigative steps occurring subsequent to the critical date—it could not 
find a genuine connection between the Katyn Massacre and the entry into force 
of the Convention.77 
Additionally, the court rejected the use of the Convention Values Test as a 
means to establish temporal jurisdiction simply because at the time of the mas-
sacre in 1940, the Convention itself did not exist.78 That the massacre preceded 
the Convention by ten years led the court to hold that a contracting party “can-
not be held responsible under the Convention for not investigating even the 
most serious crimes under international law if they predated the Convention.”79 
Thus, due to the time lapse and particular chronology of events, the ECtHR 
concluded that it did not have the temporal jurisdiction needed to evaluate 
Russia’s compliance with Article 2.80 
                                                                                                                           
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. ¶ 110. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. ¶ 157. 
 75 Id. ¶ 159. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. ¶¶ 159, 161. 
 78 Id. ¶ 160. 
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 80 Id. ¶ 161. 
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III. ANALYSIS 
A. International Customary Law 
The ECtHR should have considered Russia’s procedural obligations as 
arising out of customary law rather than out of the Convention itself.81 Since 
the court relied on the law of the Convention, it was bound to identify May 5, 
1998 as the critical date, as that is when Russia ratified the Convention.82 
Therefore, the court was also bound to find a lapse of fifty-eight years between 
the trigger event in 1940 and the critical date in 1998.83 If however, the court 
had relied on international customary law as the source of Russia’s procedural 
obligations, the lapse of time between the trigger event and the critical date 
establishing the obligations would have been significantly shorter and not “too 
long in absolute terms for a genuine connection to be established.”84 
The obligation to conduct effective investigations, existing as internation-
al custom, is best illustrated by international case law and various treaties, cat-
alyzing and ultimately codifying this obligation.85 Since these authorities date 
back to 1945, the lapse of time between the trigger event in 1940 and the new 
critical date may be as short as five years.86 Therefore, in applying the Genuine 
Connection Test, the court should have been able to find temporal jurisdiction 
over the applicants’ Article 2 claims because the new lapse of time would not 
be “too long in absolute terms” and major portions of Investigation Number 
159 would have occurred after this new critical date.87 Relying on international 
                                                                                                                           
 81 See Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punish-
ment, art. 12, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 24841 [hereinafter Convention Against Torture]; Charter of 
the International Military Tribunal, arts. 14, 15, Aug. 8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 284; McCann v. United King-
dom, App. No. 18984/91, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 161 (1995); G.A. Res. 3074 (XXVIII), ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/9326 
(Nov. 30, 1973); G.A. Res. 2583 (XXIV), ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/7840 (Dec. 15, 1969); G.A. Res. 3 (I), 10, 
U.N. Doc. A/50 (Feb. 13, 1946); Brief for Amnesty Int’l as Third Party Intervener Supporting Applicants 
at 2–3, Janowiec v. Russia, App. Nos. 55508/07 and 29520/09, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2013), available at 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/IOR61/001/2013/en/2f7e3df1-7280-46e7-802a-0088857887
22/ior610012013en.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/WS2Q-H6P3. 
 82 See Janowiec v. Russia, App. Nos. 55508/07 and 29520/09, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 104, 157 (2013). 
 83 Id. ¶ 157. 
 84 Id.; see Convention Against Torture, supra note 81, art. 12; Charter of the International Military 
Tribunal, supra note 81, arts. 14, 15; McCann, App. No. 18984/91, ¶ 161; G.A. Res. 3074 (XXVIII), 
supra note 81, ¶ 1; G.A. Res. 2583 (XXIV), supra note 81, ¶ 1; G.A. Res. 3 (I), supra note 81, at 10. 
 85 See Convention Against Torture, supra note 81, art. 12; Charter of the International Military 
Tribunal, supra note 81, arts. 14, 15; Šilih v. Slovenia, App. No. 71463/01, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 158–159 
(2009); McCann, App. No. 18984/91, ¶ 161; G.A. Res. 3074 (XXVIII), supra note 81, ¶ 1; G.A. Res. 
2583 (XXIV), supra note 81, ¶ 1; G.A. Res. 3 (I), supra note 81, at 10. 
 86 Charter of the International Military Tribunal, supra note 81, arts. 14, 15. 
 87 See id.; Janowiec, App. Nos. 55508/07 and 29520/09, ¶¶ 148, 157. 
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customary law, the Court should have adjudicated the applicants’ Article 2 
claims.88 
The following non-exhaustive list of case law and treaties, spanning from 
1995 back to 1945, represents international customary law requiring states to 
investigate the substantive violation of the right to life.89 In 1995, the ECtHR 
first imposed the procedural obligations in McCann and Others v. United 
Kingdom, holding that states were obliged to conduct effective investigations 
since the “prohibition of arbitrary killing by the agents of the State would be 
ineffective, in practice, if there existed no procedure for reviewing the lawful-
ness of the [State authorities’ acts].”90 The McCann decision is evidence of the 
ECtHR’s recognition of states’ procedural obligations prior to 1998, the date of 
the Convention’s entry into force.91 
Numerous other international treaties obligated states to conduct effective 
investigations, including the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, In-
human or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, which was concluded in 
1984.92 In this United Nations (U.N.) treaty, Article 12 requires that “[e]ach 
State Party shall ensure that its competent authorities proceed to a prompt and 
impartial investigation, wherever there is reasonable ground to believe that an 
act of torture has been committed in any territory under its jurisdiction.”93 By 
the end of the 1980s, forty-six states had ratified this treaty, and to date, 156 
states have ratified the agreement.94 The number of states and the diversity of 
these parties, both in the 1980s and today, is illustrative of a distinct pattern of 
states’ behavior that is motivated by the legal obligation to protect human 
rights, in part through thorough investigation of possible violations.95 
In the 1960s and 1970s, the U.N. General Assembly passed several reso-
lutions regarding the investigatory obligations of states in the context of war 
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crimes and other crimes against humanity.96 Specifically, a 1973 General As-
sembly resolution stated that “[w]ar crimes and crimes against humanity . . . 
shall be subject to investigation.”97 When put to vote, ninety-four members of 
the U.N. voted “Yes,” while zero members voted “No,” and only twenty-nine 
members chose to abstain from the vote.98 The vast majority of the fifty-one 
original states in the U.N. voted “Yes” on this resolution in addition to a varie-
ty of the U.N.’s newest members, which included states like Yemen, Bahrain, 
and the German Democratic Republic.99 Prior to 1973, the U.N. General As-
sembly passed a similar 1969 resolution calling on all states “to take the neces-
sary measures for the thorough investigation of war crimes and crimes against 
humanity.”100 With another overwhelming majority of the member states vot-
ing favorably—seventy-two states, including the Soviet Union, affirming and 
thirty-two abstaining—the resolution reflected a codification of the interna-
tional customary law requiring states to investigate.101 The large number of 
diverse votes in support of both resolutions indicates a distinct and defined 
pattern of states’ behavior.102 Additionally, the increase in “Yes” votes between 
1969 and 1973 demonstrates an unmistakable codification of a customary ob-
ligation to investigate.103 
Additionally, a 1946 U.N. General Assembly resolution regarding the ex-
tradition and punishment of war criminals obliged governments of member 
states, but also the “governments of States which are not Members of the Unit-
ed Nations . . . to take all necessary measures for the apprehension of [war] 
criminals.”104 While this resolution does not explicitly require states to investi-
gate, the obligation is certainly implied in the broad and expansive phrase “to 
take all necessary measures.”105 Moreover, that the U.N. addressed this resolu-
tion to non-member states suggests that this obligation to investigate trans-
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cends the limits of U.N. membership and extends to the international commu-
nity at large.106 
Lastly, in 1945, the four major Allied powers, including the Soviet Union, 
signed the Charter of the International Military Tribunal (1945 Charter), 
which, while directed at the Nazis and other European Axis powers, required 
states to conduct relevant investigations so as to advance the prosecution of 
war criminals.107 Specifically, the agreement stated that each signatory shall 
appoint a Chief Prosecutor to investigate war crimes and that each signatory 
shall individually and collaboratively undertake investigation, collection, and 
production of all necessary evidence needed in the war criminals’ prosecu-
tion.108 Thus, it was recognized even in 1945 that in order for states to uphold 
their duty to prosecute war crimes, there was a complimentary duty to conduct 
adequate investigations thereof.109 By the end of 1945, nineteen other states 
had also ratified this agreement, including other European states, like Czecho-
slovakia and Belgium, as well as states in distant locations, including Uruguay 
and Ethiopia.110 That such a wide range of states signed the agreement sug-
gests that it reflected global ideals and obligations.111 World War II, with its 
unprecedented damage and destruction, created a need for states to implement 
both preventative and putative measures that had not previously existed.112 
Thus, the 1945 Charter catalyzed a custom that required states to conduct in-
vestigations so as to effectively prosecute the violation of substantive rights, 
particularly those regarding war crimes and crimes against humanity.113 
By looking at these various treaties and international agreements, a pat-
tern of states’ behavior that is motivated by a sense of legal obligation and 
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rights emerges.114 This pattern of behavior obliging states to conduct investiga-
tions bound Russia to conduct investigations long before its 1998 ratification 
of the Convention.115 
B. The Genuine Connection Test 
Given that international customary law required Russia to conduct an ad-
equate and effective investigation of the Katyn Massacre, the Genuine Connec-
tion Test should be applied as originally done by the ECtHR, with a primary 
focus on lapse of time and a secondary focus on the post-critical date investi-
gation.116 Because the 1945 Charter of the International Military Tribunal cata-
lyzed states’ procedural obligations as international custom in 1945, the court 
should focus on that date rather than 1998.117 Using this new critical date, only 
five years passed between it and the trigger event in 1940.118 Five years falls 
well within the period of time that the court has deemed to be reasonably 
short.119 
Even if the court focused on the codification of this custom in the 1973 
General Assembly resolution, the lapse of time between 1973 and the trigger 
date is only thirty-three years.120 While thirty-three years is still, in absolute 
terms, longer than thirteen years—which the court referred to as a guide for 
appropriate application of the Genuine Connection Test—the court must recall 
that the reason for the detachable obligation is to “ensure that the rights guar-
anteed under the Convention are not theoretical or illusory, but practical and 
effective.”121 In Mladenović v. Serbia, where an off-duty police officer acci-
dentally shot and killed an individual, the Janowiec court referred to “the thir-
teen-year period separating the death of the Applicant’s son . . . and the entry 
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into force of the Convention . . . as [not] outweighing the importance of the 
procedural acts that were accomplished after the critical date.”122 
Considering the court’s own language, a thirty-three-year time lapse 
should be seen as not outweighing the importance of the procedural acts ac-
complished subsequent to 1973, which includes the 1990 production of critical 
documents to Polish authorities; the 1991 exhumations, interviews, and foren-
sic examinations of the mass graves; and the 1992 admission by Yeltsin that 
the Polish prisoners had been sentenced to death by Soviet authorities.123 There 
is an important distinction between the impact of an investigation arising from 
a World War II massacre that claimed the lives of over 21,000 prisoners, and 
one arising from a single death caused by an accidental gunshot wound, as was 
the case in Mladenović.124 The procedural acts taken after 1973 were of the 
utmost importance, particularly considering that the killing of the prisoners 
occurred “without the detainees being summoned or the charges being dis-
closed, and without any statements concerning the conclusion of the investiga-
tion or the bills of indictment being issued to [the prisoners].”125 It is precisely 
a crime like the Katyn Massacre that is grossly contrary to the Convention’s 
values that the ECtHR must address.126 
CONCLUSION 
Janowiec demonstrates the difficulty of holding states accountable for 
crimes that occurred many years in the past. The ECtHR was unable or unwill-
ing to find temporal jurisdiction over the applicants’ claims and to hold Russia 
accountable for failing to adequately investigate the Katyn Massacre. Although 
the court missed an opportunity to apply international customary law, the deci-
sion in Janowiec continues to shape and define the obligations of states to con-
duct adequate investigations into war crimes and crimes against humanity. 
Even in declining to exercise jurisdiction, the court nevertheless acknowledged 
the potential for retroactive obligations to arise in the context of remedying 
serious human rights abuses.  
                                                                                                                           
 122 Janowiec, App. Nos. 55508/07 and 29520/09, ¶ 138 (emphasis added); Mladenović, App. No. 
1099/08 ¶ 7. 
 123 See Janowiec, App. Nos. 55508/07 and 29520/09, ¶¶ 38, 40–41; G.A. Res. 3074 (XXVIII), 
supra note 81, ¶ 1. 
 124 See Janowiec, App. Nos. 55508/07 and 29520/09, ¶ 23; Mladenović, App. No. 1099/08 ¶ 7. 
 125 See Janowiec, App. Nos. 55508/07 and 29520/09, ¶ 18. 
 126 See Convention, supra note 34, at pmbl. 
